The important for Security system designs are required to be flexible enough to support multiple policies. While there are some approaches for implementing several different policies, how to support different models within the same policy family has not been answered with a satisfying solution. This is partly due to the limitation of traditional techniques for designing protection mechanisms, which decompose a system into units of functionality. Unlike the implementation of a new policy, extending a design to support a policy variant involves reusing some implemented functions. With traditional programming techniques it is inevitable to modify the existing functional units directly. In terms of object-orientation, such modifications include introducing new attributes, new member functions, and new definition of existing member functions. These are threats to the good modularity necessary to a flexible design. We propose an aspect-oriented approach to address the problem of supporting different models within the same policy family and to provide flexibility in security system design. As a case study, we present an aspect-oriented design framework for CORBA Access Control subsystem that supports different role-based access control models.
Introduction
The pervasiveness of computer systems highlights the need to engineer software that delivers services in a dependable manner. Designs of dependable software must address multiple, possibly interdependent dependability concerns such as access control, confidentiality, and data integrity.
The important for security system designs to be flexible and extensible. Usually, the flexibility and extensibility lie in that a design should be able to support different security policies, including unknown a priori policies. This is requested by various applications that may run on top of the security system. Current approaches implement multiple security policies by decoupling the policy decision and enforcement mechanisms.
Different security policies have different definition and computation processes and, therefore, are implemented in separate modules. Whenever a new policy is introduced, a new policy module needs to be added to the security system. A characteristic of many practical authorization and other security policies is that even for one policy model, there are many variants (e.g. role-based access control). When designing a security system that supports several derivatives of the same security policy model, one may implement each variant into a separate policy module. However, since all variants share the same base model, it is better to have an approach to reuse the design of the base model. Such approaches are expected to provide flexibility and extensibility, the design can be incrementally constructed to implement different variants from the same base model, even those that do not exist now.
Current approaches to the design of security systems mostly contract with the task of supporting totally different policies and do not provide methods to achieve the desirable level of design and code reuse in the above scenario.
For a security system to flexibly support various models in the same policy family, the fundamental issue is that the design of the system should accommodate extensive change, including redefinition of the composition and structure of the system. In terms of object-orientation, this means to support the introduction of new attributes, new member functions, and new definition of existing member functions. However, vanilla object-oriented programming (OOP) cannot support these changes without destroying the modularity of the implemented system. Consequently, using vanilla OOP, it is difficult to develop a flexible security system that supports different models in the same policy family.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews related work, Section 3 lists the design issues for CORBA AC necessary to address in order to support different RBAC models. Section 4 briefly introduces the AOP technology. Section 5 presents the aspect-oriented design framework for CORBA AC that supports various RBAC models as well as the rationale behind the design. Section 6 Verification Result and Discussion.
Related Work
The definition could be implemented with java and Prolog language. Then using available translating compilers, the Prolog code can be translated to C++ or Java code. Our work is different in three points.
Firstly, the approach in (R. Chandramouli, 1999 ) is for implementing totally different policies, while ours is for implementing variants in the same policy family.
(R. Chandramouli, 1999) proposes architecture for implementing multiple access control policies within the CORBA security framework. In his approach, a first-order predicate logic is used to define different access decision modules. Secondly, although (OMG.CORBAservices, 1998), can support various RBAC models, the implementation relies on translation from Prolog definitions to C++ or Java class definitions. Thirdly, though it is not our main topic, by supporting RBAC models, we present an alternative way for CORBA AC to support multiple access control policies as RBAC model itself can be used to express different access control policies. There is little work reported on implementing RBAC in CORBA systems.
The design in this paper is based on our previous research, described in (U. Lang,2003) , which shows that CORBA Security architecture is capable of supporting RBAC0 -RBAC4 and determines strategies for implementation but does not propose a specific design of CORBA Security. Using one of the strategies from (K. Beznosov and Y. Deng, 1999), this paper suggests a specific way of implementing NIST RBAC models for CORBA systems. As stated by Baldwin in (F. Ferraiolo, R. Sandhu, S. Gavrila, D.R. Kuhn and R. Chandramouli, 2001) , an AO approach is of great use because of its advantages in terms of maintenance of code. To measure its benefit, e.g., we may use the Net Option Value (NOV) formula.
Its application to security domain is promising but is still limited. Both (B.D. Win, F. Piessens, W. Joosen and T. Verhanneman, 2002; J. Viega, J.T. Bloch and P. Chandra. 2001), point out that AOP can be used to separate security concerns from application concerns. This is an important and relatively obvious application of AOP to security. Dissimilar them, we explore the use of aspectorientation to advance the design of security systems. RBAC supports three security principles: Least privilege, separation of duties and data abstraction. The objective of RBAC is to facilitate security management. Some variations of RBAC include the capability to establish relations between roles, between permissions and roles, and between users and roles. and that software engineers should not have to be concerned with security issues, and vice-versa, the development of an application should be separated, i.e., "the security code should not bemixed with the application code ( Bart De Win, Frank Piessens;Wouter There are three models defined: Core RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC, and Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSD) Relations. The Core RBAC is the base model; all the other three are based on it. We show that vanilla OOP methods cannot effectively reuse the Core RBAC design without destroying its modularity.
As a result, in the implementations of RBAC variants, code for use role hierarchy or separation of duty is scattered among code implementing the base model. Consequently, it will be difficult to tell whether a function is used by Core RBAC only, by an RBAC variant only or by both. Such a design has bad modularity, it is hard to understand, reuse and maintain. With AOP technology, it is possible to encapsulate those concerns that cannot be well modularized using OOP classes. Through the case study, we demonstrate that by properly adopting AOP techniques, different RBAC models can be incrementally constructed on the base of the Core RBAC design.
The resulting CORBA AC design has good modularity: code for Core RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC, and separation of duty RBAC can be differentiated. Hence the design is easy to understand, reuse, maintain and extend. More significantly, our approach works not just for CORBA AC. We consider, it is applicable to other security systems that demand the flexibility to support different security policies based on the same model.
There are other AOM approaches to adding security template or patterns to applications. Trillo and Rocha (Trillo, C. P.-and Rocha, V.,2005) describe an approach that describes security patterns as aspect models, and keeps them separate from the main application functionality throughout the design process (using AOP techniques also keeps them separate through implementation). Implicit in such an approach is that interactions between aspects will not be found since the aspects are never combined for analysis. If AOP techniques are used, interactions will only be found in the running system.
Design Issues
As a case study, we select to design a CORBA AC mechanism. Access control is a central function in security systems. It checks whether a user has access to a protected resource. Access control may be implemented at different levels.
The CORBA AC OMG. (Carliss Baldwin, 2002) , is architecture for enforcing access control in the middleware layer of distributed applications. It is aimed to provide a standard way to separate access control and application logic CORBA AC specification is policy neutral in that only essential and general access control interfaces are specified; those policy-specific issues, i.e. policy administration and enforcement mechanisms are left open for implementation. To implement a functional CORBA AC system, certain access control policy models have to be supported. In our design, we choose to support RBAC model specified in the proposed NIST standard (D.F. Ferraiolo,2002) , Since CORBA AC is policy neutral, in practice, designers usually avoid designing CORBA AC to support only one access control policy model. Our design, nonetheless, does not conflict with this routine. As it is indicated in (S. Osborn, R. Sandhu;Q. Munawer,2002; U. Lang,2003) , RBAC is policy neutral by itself, i.e. by proper configuration, RBAC can effectively express most existing access control policies derived from the owner-based discretionary access control (DAC) or lattice-based mandatory access control (MAC), (S. Osborn, R. Sandhu ;Q. Munawer,2002), In fact, RBAC can be used as a framework to articulate policies, though encoding of each access control policy to RBAC was discussed elsewhere and is beyond the scope of this paper. A previous study of CORBA AC architecture and Core RBAC specification by Beznosov and Deng showed that the functions defined in them are fairly orthogonal (K. Beznosov, Y. Deng, 1999), Due to its general nature, CORBA AC does not have policy specific administrative and system functions. Such functions are defined in Core RBAC. But, unlike CORBA, in which all the functions are grouped into various interfaces, the functions defined by NIST RBAC are not defined over any specific structure of system modules. This is because the NIST RBAC model is agnostic to specific technologies and systems. As a result, in the design of a CORBA AC mechanism, one issue is to define CORBA interfaces to support the NIST RBAC abstract functions. In those cases, when the functions overlap with operations defined in CORBA AC architecture, we will keep CORBA AC interfaces untouched, and "merge" related RBAC functions into CORBA AC operations. The most challenging issue in provisioning for policy evolution is to support different RBAC models in a flexible manner.
The Core RBAC model contains functions for basic role-based access control. It does not support role hierarchy or any constraints. At the beginning, an application may need the basic RBAC mechanism only. As the whole system and security requirements evolve, more advanced features of RBAC might become necessary.
It is our purpose to avoid a monolithic design, for it is neither flexible nor extensible. The use of a common interface, based on Facade design pattern (E. Gamma, R. Helm, R. Johnson and J. Vlissides 1994), to call different policy modules is a possible solution. However, such a solution would suffer from unnecessary code duplication. Since the implementation of hierarchical RBAC and constrained RBAC models are actually based on that of the Core RBAC model, an ideal way is to reuse the implementation for Core RBAC, and add the modules that support hierarchical RBAC or constrained RBAC without destroying the modularity of Core RBAC. The resulting implementation therefore could be configurable. By adding or removing the modules for hierarchical RBAC or constrained RBAC, the CORBA AC mechanism can support different RBAC models. In section 4, we present an approach that uses aspect-oriented software development techniques to add support for different RBAC models without sacrificing modularity.
As Kiczales et al. point out in (G. Kiczales, J, 1997); existing programming languages including object-oriented, procedural and functional languages decompose a system into functional components, and criticize AspectJ to implement security concerns, ironically due to its excessive flexibility, because security is a very rigid and strict concept.. However the implementations of some properties (e.g. synchronization, real-time constraints, error handling, audit, security enforcement) cannot be encapsulated into a single component. Frequently classified as "crosscutting properties", they are usually present in more than one functional component. Implementations of such properties in mainstream languages necessarily result in tangled code. Code tangling denotes use of a single method for implementing multiple properties. In section 4, we discuss the code tangling problem as we present the aspect oriented design approach.
The purpose of aspect-oriented software development (AOSD) is to provide methods to decompose a problem into both functional components and components containing otherwise crosscutting properties, and then to compose these components together. The hope behind the AOSD methodology is that by encapsulating the crosscutting properties (a.k.a., "crosscutting concerns"), the previously lost modularity could be regained. There are several specific AOSD models. We adopt the one used in AspectJ (J.D. Gradecki and N. Lesiecki, 2003) , an aspect-oriented extension of Java. In AspectJ, there are two types of crosscutting:
Dynamic crosscutting and static crosscutting: Dynamic crosscutting supports defining and advising points during the dynamic execution of a program. Static crosscutting allows adding new attributes, operations, and many other declarations that may affect the static type hierarchy to a class or aspect. Together, dynamic and static crosscuttings provide a totally new way to encapsulate crosscutting concerns. Novel as it is, the aspect-oriented method behind AspectJ is relatively easy to understand. Some key concepts are defined (from J.D. Gradecki and N. Lesiecki, 2003), modified below:
 Pointcut: a structure designed to identify and select join points within a program  Join point: a predictable point in the execution of an application..  Advice: code to be executed when a join point is reached in the application code.
 Inter-type declaration: a powerful mechanism to add attributes and methods to previously established classes.  Aspect: a structure similar to an OO class that encapsulates join points, pointcuts, advices, and inter-type declarations.the Join point, pointcut, and advice are used to realize dynamic crosscutting. The join point is a well defined point in a program where another concern will crosscut this program. It can be method calls, constructor calls, method call execution, constructor call execution, field get, field set, exception handler execution and other points in the execution of a program. AspectJ uses a designator that takes a join point as a parameter to tell the aspect oriented program when it should match the join point.
The pointcut is a structure to group such designators. Whenever, a join point is matched by a designator, the pointcut containing it is triggered. Some advice defined for the triggered pointcut will be executed. The advice is executed before, after, or instead of the join point. Inter-type declaration is for static crosscutting.
New attributes and methods can be added to existing classes without explicitly modifying the classes. In addition to the traditional OOP component class, AOP introduces a new component type aspect. The aspect is used to encapsulate crosscutting concerns. It contains the join points, pointcuts, and advices. Next section explains our aspect-oriented design approach to designing security systems while we describe the CORBA AC design framework.
Design Principle and Diagrams

Main Concern
Generally, in aspect-oriented design, given a design objective, the first step is to identify the "main concern" of the application. For a legacy system, existing design can be selected as the main concern. New properties thus are encapsulated in aspects. By defining join points and inter-type declarations, new features are implemented without directly modifying the design of the main concern. For a new system, the criteria for choosing the main concern are: 1. The main concern should realize the basic functions of the system. 2. The functions in the main concern are relatively stable; require less flexibility and extensibility.
3.
Crosscutting concerns at the same design level with the basic functions should not be included into the code that implements the main concern. Under a main concern, there may be some crosscutting "sub-concerns". It is not necessary to apply AOP at all levels and try to encapsulate all crosscutting sub-concerns. In this case study, our objective is to design a CORBA AC mechanism that can support various RBAC models. Consider the fact that a functional CORBA AC must support at least one authorization model, and all RBAC variants are based on the Core RBAC model, we define CORBA AC that supports Core RBAC as the main concern of the design.
By analyzing the NIST RBAC functional specification, we determine that the implementation of all other RBAC models can be viewed as crosscutting properties of Core RBAC. From now on, we use "base design" to designate the design of main concern. Inside the base design, we use vanilla OO approach. An important goal of AOP is to achieve the separation of concerns principle (E.W. Dijkstra., 1976), which stipulates a system developer can focus on a single concern in each system module without having to address other concerns. Therefore, during the process of building the base design of CORBA AC, we do not have to consider how to support other RBAC models. From the functional point of view, the base design is divided into three parts: Policy administration, authentication and access control enforcement.
Most functions in the policy administration part are defined according to NIST RBAC specification. Function names are adjusted to conform to CORBA IDL naming style Mapping RBAC to CORBA AC 
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The authentication part consists of four interfaces: Principal Authenticator, Credentials, Credentials List and Current. All of them come from CORBA AC specification. The relationship between the interfaces can be seen from Figure 2 . It is worth indicating that some system functions defined in NIST RBAC are merged into interfaces specified by CORBA AC. They are:  Create Session: is now part of PrincipalAuthenticator::authenticate()'s work. Upon successfully authenticated, a Credentials object will be created by Principal Authenticator. The Credentials object and the principal uniquely identifying it are equal to the session in RBAC.  DeleteSession: Credentials::destroy() is used to destroy Credentials object as well as related entry in the UAList.  AddActiveRole or DropActiveRole: they are part of the work of Credentials::set_attributes(), since role is a special type of attributes. There is one Current object residing on both client's and target's sides. The Current object provides an interface for applications on top of ORB to acquire current execution context including Credentials. It maintains a list of existing Credentials objects.
Figure 2. Authentication interfaces
The connection of policy administration and authentication parts is established via method calls from Principal Authenticator and Credentials to UserList and UAList. The authentication process is shown in Figure 3 . First, the Principal Authenticator checks if the user is in the User List, and verifies the user's security information. To simplify the design, we use username/password based authentication, but this design does not have any limitation on the authentication technologies. Upon verification of the user identity, PrincipalAuthenticator asks UAList for the user's assigned roles. If the user requested roles are subset of the set of its assigned roles, then the whole authentication process ends successfully. A Credential object will be created for the new principal who will act on behalf of the user.
Interfaces for access control enforcement come from the specification of CORBA AC. The access control enforcement part utilizes the information contained in the Credentials via the Current interface.
The Access Decision interface is the centerpiece of this part. Once it receives the request to make an access decision, it will interact with other interfaces showing in Figure 4 to decide whether the access should be allowed or denied. The process of evaluating the access request is represented by UML sequence diagram in Figure 5 . As the AccessControlInterceptor gets an access request, it asks the Current object for a reference to AccessDecision object (ADO).
Then it calls ADO.access_allowed() with principal's id, the names of target and operation to be invoked as parameters, and waits for a decision. The ADO will first query the Current object for the principal's security attributes (roles), next it will find the target object's direct domain manager, get the domain access policy, and obtain the effective rights of the principal. In the case of hierarchical security domains, ADO will repeat the activities in the frame (which represents loop, informal) in Figure 5 , until there is no superior domain. At this stage, we assume a domain can only have one direct superior domain. If necessary, ADO needs to combine the effective rights granted by access policies of different domain levels. After that, ADO queries Required Rights object for the set of required rights to invoke the operation on the target.
Finally, depending on the required rights combination policy, to allow an access, the set of effective rights must either be a superset of required rights or have a non-empty common subset with required rights. Having an object-based design; next we will describe how to define different RBAC models as concerns crosscutting with the main concern, Core RBAC. In this paper, we only present the design of two RBAC models: General Role Hierarchy (GRH) RBAC and RBAC, for it is enough to illustrate our AOP based approach to the design of security systems. 
Aspect One -General Role Hierarchy Role Based Access Control
To implement GRH RBAC model reusing the base design, five new functions-AddInheritance, DeleteInheritance, AuthorizedUsers, AuthorizedRoles, get_authorized_attributes will be added, and two existing functions -CreateSession, AddActiveRole have to be redefined.
Similar but not equal to the Assigned Users and Assigned Roles functions defined in the Core RBAC model, AuthorizedUsers and Authorized Roles are used to find all authorized users of a given role or all authorized roles for a given user. While 'Assigned' operations only return users or roles based on the UA relation, 'Authorized' operations find and return users or roles based on both UA relation and the inheritance relation among roles.
For example, if the role 'project manager' inherits the role 'engineer', and Tom is assigned to 'project manager', then the authorized roles of Tom include both 'project manager' and 'engineer'. In the GRH RBAC model, the 'Authorized' operations are actually used in the previous positions of the 'Assigned' operations, just because after the introduction of role hierarchy, the 'Assigned-' operations cannot return all the roles a user (or all the users a role) has been authorized. The CreateSession and AddActiveRole need to be redefined to handle role hierarchy. In the base design, CreateSession is implemented as part of PrincipalAuthenticator::authenticate (); and AddActiveRole is part of Credentials::set_attributes ().
Role hierarchy needs to be dealt with when the authenticate() and set_attributes() call AList::get_assigned_attributes(). The get_assigned_attributes() function is neither in CORBA AC specification nor in NIST RBAC. It is defined by us to make the RBAC information available for authentication use. Now authenticate() and set attributes() need authorized attributes instead of assigned attributes of a given user. It worth to explain why vanilla OOP approaches cannot be used to satisfy the requirement given in Section 1.
To design a CORBA AC system that can support different RBAC models in a flexible manner, there are two possible ways to apply the OOP method. One is to consider roles, role hierarchy, and constraints at the very beginning of the design process. The generated design should support all the models in the proposed NIST standard. It seems such an AC system can be configured to enforce different RBAC models, and there is no need to modify the design to support role hierarchy or constraints for they have already been taken care of. But security policies, like RBAC model, tend to evolve.
If new RBAC models appear in the future, how could this design handle the new models this type of design with all anticipated policy variants supported from the very beginning is actually a design we are trying to avoid because of its inability to evolve in response to changes in policy requirements.
The second way is to implement each RBAC model in a separate policy module. However, since implementations of RBAC models are backward compatible (e.g. an AC system supports GRH RBAC must support Core RBAC), separate modules are not quite necessary. The key is how to give a base design which can be flexibly extended to support more advanced RBAC models. It is inevitable to modify the definition of classes in the base design if using vanilla OOP method. For example, now, new applications demand GRH RBAC to be supported. With vanilla OOP method, we need to add the 'Authorized-' operations directly to UA class and UAList class.
The new concern needs insert or modify functions of the main concern. The changes cannot be localized. This is why we say the concern of supporting GRH RBAC is crosscutting the main concern. Vanilla OOP does not have a good way to deal with the crosscutting concerns. To maintain the modularity of both base design and design for GRH concern, we decide to use an AOP approach which uses a new structure "aspect" to encapsulate crosscutting concerns.
 The Criteria For Defining Aspects Are: 1. An aspect implements only one concern, which must crosscut the main concern or other aspects. 2. Aspects should hold only functions or inter-type declarations that will otherwise crosscut the main concern or other aspects. Attributes and operations that are specific to a certain class and do not crosscut other classes should be defined in that class instead of aspect. Based on the criteria, an aspect GRH is defined for GRH RBAC.
As criterion 2 requires, aspect should not contain everything for implementing the new concern. Sometimes a single aspect is not sufficient for implementing a concern; some classes need to be defined too. Criterion 2 ensures good modularity while limiting possible abuse of aspects. Abusing aspects will destroy the abstraction and encapsulation that have already been achieved via objectoriented design. In the base design, role is a type of security attribute. To support GRH RBAC, a Role class inheriting SecAttribute is added. And two new functions -AddInheritance and DeleteInheritance are defined in the Role class. By doing so, we do not modify the base design, so in this case, we do not have to use aspect. AuthorizedUsers and Authorized Roles are two new functions closely related to the UA class and UAList class.
Directly inserting them into these two classes will destroy the modularity of base design. So they are defined as inter-type declarations in the GRH aspect. As it is defined in section 3, inter-type declaration is a mechanism for adding new methods to existing classes. Although at the compilation stage, the new methods will be woven into their target classes; there is no need to modify the UA class and UAList class at the design stage. For the same reason, get_authorized_attributes() is defined in the GRH aspect as a inter-type declaration targeting the UAList class for returning authorized roles instead of assigned roles. To make PrincipalAuthenticator::authenticate() and Credentials::set_attributes() be able to handle role hierarchies, we do not explicitly change the method call UAList::get_assigned_attributes() in these two operations to UAList::get_authorized_attributes(). The method calls to UAList::get_assigned_attributes() in PrincipalAuthenticator and Credentials classes are defined as a join point.
A designator used to match this join point is defined in a pointcut 'handle_rh' in GRH aspect. Once the join point is reached in the execution, it will be matched and trigger the 'handle_rh' pointcut. The <<around>>2 type advice defined for the 'handle_rh' pointcut will be executed. The advice will call UAList.get_authorized_attributes(). The effect is get_authorized_attributes() is executed instead of get_assigned_attributes().
The UML class diagram for the aspect design. Among all the classes shown in the class diagrams of the main concern, only those affected by the new concern is displayed, others are reused without any change so they are not displayed here. The names of the aspect and class introduced for the new concern is in italic.
Since UML currently does not support aspect-oriented modeling, we have to extend UML to represent aspect-oriented concepts. The extension is informal. It is enough to model this design, though it may be inadequate to describe other aspect oriented designs.
To support GRH RBAC, a GRH aspect and a Role class is defined. In GRH aspect, a stereotype <<introduction>> is defined to represent inter-type declarations. The name after <<introduction>> but before ':' is the name of the target class to which the new method is added.
For example, authorized_users() is introduced to UAList and authorized_attributes() is introduced to UA (Note the names of the methods have been changed to confirm CORBA's naming routine). The GRH aspect dynamically crosscuts Principal Authenticator and Credentials classes. A navigated association with stereotype <<pointcut>> is used to represent the crosscutting. The name at aspect side is the pointcut's name, and the name at class side is the defined join point. In this case, the pointcut is 'handle_rh'.
The join point is the method call to UAList.get_assigned_attributes() in PrincipalAuthenticator and Credentials. The '!' sign before the name of join point indicates this is a method call type join point. From the UML class diagram, the content of the <<around>> type advice for pointcut 'handle_rh' is invisible (Like OOP class, the content of a method class is invisible in the class diagram level). We have explained the action of this advice in the above. One obvious benefit brought by AOP method is the boundary between main concern and new concern is very clear. The class definitions of main concern have not been modified. And the implementation for new concern is encapsulated by aspect and new class.
The whole design is neatly modularized. This is hard to achieve with vanilla OO method. The flexibility offered by AOP approach is more obvious if there is more than one aspect. We will see this after adding another aspect for implementing the RBAC model.
The Framework advantages
The proposed frameworks rely of the aspect oriented design. AOD has been introduced to make systems modular and reusable. Our frame work adopt such technique as a fundamental techniques during the it's design, thus the framework inherits these properties giving the approach the following advantages in compare with the non-AOP.
Better Modularity
With AOP technology, it is possible to encapsulate those concerns that cannot be modularized using OOP classes. Through the case study, we have demonstrated that by properly adopting AOP techniques, different RBAC models could be incrementally constructed on the base of the Core RBAC design. The resulting CORBA AC design has good modularity, where the code for Core RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC, and separation of duty RBAC could be differentiated. Hence the design is easy to understand, reuse, maintain and extend. More significantly, our approach works not just for CORBA AC. We believe that it is applicable to other security systems, that demand the flexibility to support different security policies based on the same model and that being shown in the engineering department case study, where the roles and permissions are derived and redesigned using the in an AOD form based on the proposed frame work. The Core RBAC model contains functions for basic role-based access control. It does not support role hierarchy or any constraints. Constrained RBAC models are actually based on that of the Core RBAC model. An ideal way is to reuse the implementation for Core RBAC, and add the modules that support hierarchical RBAC or constrained RBAC without destroying the modularity of Core RBAC. The resulting implementation therefore can be configurable. By adding or removing the modules for hierarchical RBAC or constrained RBAC, the CORBA AC mechanism can support different RBAC mode.
Better Reusability:
The dynamic and static crosscutting mechanisms provided by AspectJ make the existing design easily reusability. AOSD, and in particular its composition mechanism, provides the means to design more reusable security components. From a developer's perspective, AOSD drastically changes the composition of business and security logic. In traditional software engineering, techniques composition is mostly a programmatically matter (through inlining, aggregation, delegation and so forth) and hence behavior and composition are necessary. In AOSD, the behavioral and composition logics are separated, which is possible due to the migration of the crosscutting coupling between modules from the consumer side to the provider side. As a result, the composition of an aspect can be modified without changing the behavior, which is clearly a major advantage in the context of reusable components. The reusability scope for aspects is therefore broader compared to the traditional class reuse, where support for explicit modularization requires security experts to develop components for the security measures. As a result, the reusability of these mechanisms will improve. Therefore this approach will greatly enhance the reusability of the base as well as provide great flexibility for RBAC evolution to meet new system needs.
Better Maintainability
Since there is no tangled code across the concerns, modification within one concern will not have unexpected effects on other concerns. AOSD beneficially influences the maintenance of secure applications. Due to a better modularization, the security logic is more localized, which eases the upgrade of security components to newer versions. Actually, advanced separation-of-concerns techniques enable an approach, where one tries to build a system in such a way that security mechanisms can be merged into the system in a flexible way. This leads to an evolvable system, which is only moderately secured at the beginning, but can adapt its security mechanisms relatively easy to changing risks in the environment in which it operates. Furthermore, the fact that the security aspects of an application become more evolvable enables another methodology for building secure systems, one that is more based on a monitor-and-evolve idea than on a get-it-right-the-first-time idea. As such, the penetrate-and-patch approach can persist, but one should build a system in such a way that the upgrading becomes cleaner, easier and more powerful.
Verification Result and Discussion
The goal of system verification is to establish what is possible and what is not. When performing logical verification we are especially interested in determining whether design requirements could possibly be violated, not necessarily in how likely or unlikely such violations might be. Dramatic system failures are almost always the result of seemingly unlikely sequences of events: that is precisely why these sequences of events are often overlooked in the design phase.
Once we understand how a requirement may be violated, we can reconsider the original design decisions made, and devise alternate strategies that can prevent the error from occurring. Given the SPIN model S, this means S╞P. When the PrTN model is translated to SPIN model, some reductions are performed through hiding irrelevant details, such as the information contained in a Credentials object other than roles, and by reducing an array of elements to a single element, such as making a Credentials object contain a single role, or making policy database contain a single policy entry. These reductions help to obtain a highly abstract model while still preserving the essential characteristics of the model From the above results we can come to the following, the work guides a designer to go through the design phase of a RBAC service, and to make design decisions. Right now, this overall process has two sub processes: a design process using aspect-oriented decomposition and composition, and a modeling process formally specifying the aspect-oriented design.RBAC is a family of AC models. Considering reusability, flexibility and extensibility, the design of a RBAC service is essentially a design of a program family. A good design and implementation modularity is the key to develop a program family.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present an aspect-oriented approach to designing flexible and extensible security systems. As a case study, we give a CORBA AC design framework. In this framework, various RBAC models are incrementally constructed on the base design of Core RBAC. We show that using vanilla OOP, the modularity of the base design will be necessarily cracked, which will result in tangled code. Such design is hard to understand, reuse, maintain and extend. Our approach utilizes the mechanisms provided in AspectJ to encapsulate crosscutting concerns in aspects and handle crosscutting without modifying the existing design. Comparing with non-AOP approaches, our approach to designing CORBA AC has the following advantages:
 Modularity: due to the use of aspect to encapsulate crosscutting concerns, the boundary among main concern, GRH RBAC concern and RBAC concern is clear.  Reusability: the dynamic and static crosscutting mechanisms provided by AspectJ make the reuse of existing design easy.  Maintainability: since there is no tangled code across the concerns, modification within one concern will not have unexpected effects on other concerns.  Flexibility and extensibility: in the same way, Limited Role Hierarchy (LRH) RBAC, DSD RBAC and even unknown future RBAC variants can be incrementally added to the system.
